THE PROPOSED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
AS A PROBLEM IN CODIFICATION
FitmmucK K.

BEUTEL*

The knowledge of an English Lawyer is nothing but a beggarly account of
scraps and fragments. His memory may be stored with numerous particulars,but of
the law as a whole, and of the relationsof its parts, he has not a conception. Austin.t
To correct this condition still existing in America almost a century later, was one

of the purposes behind the projected codification of the commercial law.
The proposed Uniform Commercial Code is probably the most important piece
of business legislation ever prepared in the United States, if not in the world. It
compares favorably in volume and subject matter with the French and German
Commercial Codes.

Because the Code is designed to have the force of law and

control the major part of interstate mercantile and financing transactions, whereas
the Restatement is non-official and has no more than advisory effect, it is more important than the American Law Institute Restatement of the Law.
The new Commercial Code, the product of very complete and important
cooperation between the American Law Institute and the Commission on Uniform
Laws, comes into being with the prestige and the promise of success assured by the
joint efforts of these two great legal organizations. The fact that the Commission
on Uniform Laws is willing to replace sixty years of successful effort in the creation
and adoption of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, the Warehouse Receipts
Act, Sales Act, Bills of Lading Act, Stock Transfer Act, and other statutes which
have succeeded in obtaining substantial uniformity of legislation in their field, shows
that the commissioners have justifiable faith in the project.
For the purpose of this discussion the old quarrel between codification and noncodification as to which can establish the best system of law can be set aside. So far
as uniform commercial laws are concerned, fifty years' experience has established the
fact that codification is the only successful means to uniformity where so many
separate jurisdictions are involved. The writer, from the beginning,1 has been one
of the hardiest supporters of the project, and believes it feasible and the only
present solution to the pressing problem of unifying the basic law of commercial
*A.B. 1921, Cornell University; LL.B. 1925, S.J.D. 1928, Harvard University.
University of Nebraska.

Professor of Law,

"l' LEcTuREs ON JuiRspRUDENcE 1117 (3d ed., Campbell, 1869), JEROmE HALL, KEaDINSs IN JmusPRUDENCE 333 (1938).
' As far back as 1932 the writer recommended complete codification of the uniform commercial laws.
Beutel, The N. . L. Should Not Be Amended, 8o U. oF PA. L. Rav. 368, 385 (932); see also, BRANNAN'S
NEGOTIABLE INsTRUmENTs LAW 1124 (Beutel, 5th Ed. 1932); Beutel, The Proposed Bank Collection Act
and Possibility of Recodification of the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 9 TULANE L. RXv. 378 (i935).
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transactions. It is the type of endeavor which deserves every success and the cooperation of the best talent that the legal and commercial field has to offer.
Since the Code is still in a very fluid state and particular provisions are subject to
radical change at any time, the present discussion will be confined to general principles and broad outlines, using as a basis of reference the proposed final draft of
the spring of 195o as changed by the September revisions.
The policy behind the Code is superb, the only question remaining is the quality
of the present product.
I
SPONSORING ORGANIZATION AND WORKING PERSONNEL

As indicated by the Comment to the title section of the Code,2 the project is the
joint effort of the Commission on Uniform Laws and the American Law Institute.
Its production is under the direct supervision of a drafting board headed by Judge
Herbert F. Goodrich, Director of the American Law Institute. The actual drafting
was done by members of the faculties of leading law schools who were individually
designated to draft various sections. Each section has a group of advisers consisting of specially selected judges, practicing lawyers, and law teachers. The advisers
meet with the draftsmen on frequent occasions to debate and alter the draft both
as to substance and form. After a draft has cleared the advisers it is examined
by the Council of the American Law Institute and either the Commercial Acts
Section or the Property Acts Section of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws. Thereafter it is discussed in a joint meeting of the Commission and
American Law Institute, where controversial matters are debated and settled in
democratic fashion by a majority vote of those present. Then the Code returns
to the draftsmen for further alteration in accordance with the results of the debate,
and sometimes the process is' repeated. The proposed final draft contains about
three pages' with names of prominent lawyers, judges, and law teachers who are
engaged in this process of codification.
Although the array of talent is very imposing, a careful examination of the
process will show that most of these people have only casual connection with the
Code. The pressure to complete the work within the five years prescribed by the
financing foundation has been so great that the proposed drafts to be discussed in the
larger meetings have usually come to the hands of the members only a few days before the gathering; and it is not uncommon for the agenda, draft, or subject of the
debate to be handed to those present after they are seated in the committee rooms.
Under these circumstances, since the members are all busy people, they have been
able to give the drafts only casual examination. The debate that follows by the
members of the drafting staff and those assembled for the discussion presents a one2Pp. 2ff. Proposed Final Draft, Uniform Commercial Code (Spring, x950).

Unless otherwise desig-

nated, hereafter references to sections will be to this edition as corrected by September, 1950, Revisions of
Articles 2, 4 and 9. Page numbers, unless otherwise indicated, will be to the Spring edition.
a See pp. 4-6 inclusive.
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sided picture in which a completely prepared draftsman debates with necessarily
unprepared members. The result has been that, even in shocking examples of
errors in the Code, 4 a majority of those present, being unacquainted with the subject of the debate, have almost always voted in favor of the proposed draft. Thus
many errors in policy and draftsmanship which would have been exposed by a
more complete study by the larger groups are approved for final publication under
this one-sided procedure.
The real work of drafting and criticism is done by the smaller group of draftsmen and advisers under the direction of Professor Karl N. Llewellyn who has much
experience in this type of work.5 It is upon their shoulders that the greater burden
of creating a workable code must necessarily fall. In setting up this inner organization the plan of the American Law Institute, with only slight changes, has been
adopted.
The eight or more draftsmen who are creating the Code, as set out in an earlier
draft," all seem to be people who are or at some time have been law teachers. At
the time of their appointment three had held full professorships, the rest were of
lower academic rank. Five of the ten articles of the Code seem to have been in
the direct charge of Professor Llewellyn 7 and the remainder' were drafted by the
other seven under his supervision.
The draftsmen for each article have had a group of advisers totaling twentytwo individuals' divided into committees of not over six or seven persons for each
Article made up of judges, law professors, and practicing lawyers, many of whom
served on more than one committee. The make-up of the various advisory groups
seems to be as much on a basis of representation of membership in the Institute and
the Commission on Uniform Laws as on the expert qualifications of the individuals
chosen as advisers. These facts tend to concentrate even more upon the draftsmen
the responsibility for the technical excellence of the Code.
The task of drafting a commercial code is more complicated and important
than the work of merely restating portions of the common law. Not only must
the draftsmen be entirely familiar with wide areas of the law as it exists, they must
also be able to fashion an instrument for the regulation of a myriad of commercial
situations both present and future which insures continuity of the law and business
"Among others the provisions of Sections 1-1o5 and 1-107 discussed below have been debated and
approved at least once by close votes.
'Professor Llewellyn during his service on the Commission on Uniform Laws, drafted some amendments to the N. I. L. which were never approved; he is also the draftsman of the Trust Receipts and
parts of many other uniform acts most of which are.narrow statutes. His most famed writings are
in the field of Jurisprudence; but he has published a case book in Sales.
eThe May, 1949, Draft contains the names of draftsmen and committees of advisers in the Comment to the first section of each Article. For example, see p. 35 (1949 Draft). In following the list
the article numbers will have to be changed to correspond with the z95o draft.
'Sales, Letters of Credit, Documents of Title, Miscellaneous Banking Transactions, and Bulk Transactions.
'Commercial Paper, William E. Prosser and Fairfax Leary; Bank Deposits and Collections, Fairfax
Leary; Investment Securities, Soia Mentschikoff (Mrs. Llewellyn); Secured Transactions, Allison Dunham,

Grant Gilmore, Charles Bunn, Fairfax Leary.
"For a list of these men see the 1949 Draft, supra note 6.
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practices, is sufficiently sharp to cut out injustice, and remains flexible enough to
allow for legitimate change. This requires knowledge, skill, and insight which can
only be furnished by a large and carefully manned research and drafting organization.
Even if this staff of workers were as numerous and able as those who compiled
the Restatement 0° it is highly doubtful if the same type of organization which did
that work could prepare in five or six years a suitable commercial code when the
first three volumes of the Restatement 11 required over ten years for completion.12
It should also be noted that the compilation of the Commercial Codes of France",
and Germany' 4 which are comparable but not so difficult, each occupied for seven
to ten years the best legal minds of those two countries.
In a project of the size and importance of the Commercial Code it would seem
that a full-time Editor-in-Chief'3 would need, on the legal side alone, the help of at
least thirty of the most distinguished legal scholars in the fields being codified.
Careful study might cause one to doubt if these legal standards have been met.0
There is a further major difficulty with the organization of this project. Since
it is creating law to control complicated commercial transactions, mere collection of
legal data and ex cathedra statements of rules of law as was the case in the Restatement, will not suffice. Because this Code is designed to control business activities,
there should be among its intimate advisers impartial experts on commercial transactions comparable in numbers to the legal staff, to aid in constructing the provisions
of the Code which ought to be supported by research data on the commercial transactions being created and regulated. So far as the writer knows there was no such
advice and research except possibly in the preparation of the Bank Collections and
Letters of Credit part of the Code.' 7
Of course there was copious advice from commercial pressure groups like the
American Bankers Association. But this is always slanted in the interest of the
group and is likely to do more harm than good. Hence the absolute necessity for
impartial and expert commercial research which delves into the practices and needs
of both sides of the commercial transactions. This requires a "grubbing for facts"
far beyond knowledge of rules of law, records of decided cases, or the express desires
of organized commercial interests. In absence of such careful economic research it
10

These draftsmen and advisers are listed in the first part of each volume, for example, see MasTTa-

TMNT, CONTRACTS ix (932);
11

RESTATEMENT, TRusTS X (1935).

Conflicts, Contracts, Torts.
' The work was begun in 1923 and the final volumes of these first three Restatements were published

in 1934. See Restatements, supra notes io and ii.
" See 21 COMMECAL LAws oF T-m NVOR.LD 5.

i 24 COaMMrMcxc
LAws OF THE WORLD 6.
"During the time the Code was in process Professor Llewellyn taught a full-time schedule at both
Columbia and Harvard Law Schools, was on the Executive Committee of the Association of American
Law Schools as President-elect and President, and also carried on many other professional activities.
10Anybody desiring to make a comparative study of the respective careers of the framers and
advisers of the Commercial Code and the Restatements may find them listed in the 1949 draft supra
note 6 in the first comments to each Article, and in the Prefaces to the respective Restatements. The
Directory of the Association of American Law Schools will give a summary of the careers of the draftsmen
of the Restatements and the Code, almost all of whom are or have been law teachers.
' Uniform Commercial Code, Proposed Final Draft, Spring, 195o, p. 6.
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is doubtful whether any commercial code could be more than an experimental shot
in the dark.
Although these disturbing facts tend to raise a cloud of doubt, only an examination of the draft itself will indicate whether or not the editors have succeeded in
producing an instrument worthy of the purpose.
II
CHoicE OF LANGUAGE

Since the Code is still in the tentative state, detailed and technical examination
of specific language is not fruitful at this time, except that it may be helpful in
correcting the numerous errors of draftsmanship and printing which are still legion
throughout the draft, but which are being corrected by the diligent staff that is at
hand to give attention at any time to the latest official copy. This discussion then
will be confined to generalities of the plan and its execution with only enough
reference to specific provisions to illustrate the points involved.
A. Definitions
Because codes are written embodiments of the law, choice of language is of
paramount consideration. This draft is largely built upon technical words particularly defined, directly or by reference, in nine sections' containing approximately
one hundred and eighty separate, complete or partial definitions. Of these, forty-five
are set out in Article i as general terms to be used throughout the Code. Subject
to additional definitions and "unless the context otherwise requires,"'" they purport
to be applicable to the entire Code. Forty-five more definitions are scattered over
eight articles with the prefix "in this article unless the context otherwise requires."20
Approximately ninety other definitions with the introduction "other definitions
applying to this article"'" and with no limiting phrases, are scattered throughout
eight other articles. Thirty-seven of these ninety terms are repeated in at least two
articles as "definitions in other articles applicable to this article." 22 Nineteen are
used in three or more articles and one, "check," is used in four or more.
These definitions would appear to be the skeleton of language upon which
the Code is built; but it should be noted in passing that they are only a fraction
of the terms which are subject to general or partial definitions throughout the
Code, too numerous to catalogue here, and which fall within the catch-all phrases
of Section i-2ox: "Subject to additional definitions and unless the context otherwise
requires."
Among the one hundred and eighty odd definitions are many terms ingeniously
constructed to meet the technical needs of the legal relations being codified. There
are also many definitions which change the dictionary or well-established legal
2s 1-201,

2-103, 3-102, 4-104, 5-103, 6-103, 7-102, 8-02, 9-105.

10 1-201.
0

" For example see 2-103(1) and 3-102(1).
"For example see 2-103(2) and 3-102(2).
" For example see 2-103(3) and 3-102(3).

these repeated terms in detail here.

It would not serve any particular purpose to set out
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meaning of the terms either by giving them connotations totally or partially foreign
to their established usage or by cutting out or adding to the context of the word
much that changes its ordinarily understood meaning. For example merchant
is defined in Section 2-104 as:
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise holds himself
out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an
agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having
such knowledge or skill. With respect to transactions of financing, payment, collection,
and the like, a financing agency is a "merchant."
This word then becomes the basis of a sharp cleavage between legal rights of
persons dealing in goods throughout Article 2 of the Code.P
An extreme example of the extent to which the draftsmen have twisted the wellestablished meaning of words may be found in the definition of two terms: Local
Bank and Metropolitan BankY4
"Indirect remittance" is the use by a bank without foreign correspondents of the foreign
credit facilities of another bank. In indirect remittance transactions the bank dealing
with the original customer is the "local bank" and the bank whose credit facilities are used
is the "metropolitan bank." Unless otherwise agreed, a local bank is a customer of a
metropolitan bank.
These are not isolated examples of unusual slips in draftsmanship. At least
one hundred25 out of the one hundred and eighty defined terms partake, wholly or
"'Among others see 2-209(2), 2-314(), 2-603, 2-6o 5 (i)(b), 2-609(2).
"'6-iog(i).
The words with unusual meanings and the sections in which they occur are set out below. The
words in quotes are from the text of the Code; those in parenthesis, their approximate dcfined meanings.
Sec. x-20Z

(2)

"Aggrieved party" (?).

(3) and (so) Distinction between Agreement and Contract (contract rights and obligations).
(4)
(5)
( 9)
(is)
(s6)
(5g)
(21)

(23)
(24)

(26)
(27)
(28)
(30)
(31)
(32)

(33)
(35)
(37)
(38)
(39)
(40)

"Bank" (Banker).

"Bearer" (Possessor).
"Conspicuous" (?).
"Creditor" (Creditor and Fiduciary).
"Fungible" (Equivalent Units).
"Holder" (Possessor of Negotiable Paper); cf. 3-302(l).
"Insolvency proceedings" (Liquidation Proceedings).
"Money" (Legal Exchange).
"Notice" (constructive notice).
"Notifies" (Reasonable steps toward Notice).
"Organization" (Legal or commercial entity).
"Party" (Contractor).
"Presumption" (Rebuttable Presumption).
"Purchase" (Transfer of interest).
"Purchaser" (Transferee of interest).
"Remedy" (Remedial right).
"Rights" ("Includes remedies").
"Send" (?).
"Signed" (Authentication).
"Surety" ("includes guarantor").
"Telegram" (?).
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(41) '"r-&" (?).
(44) "Wares of commerce" (Goods delivered to bailee).
(45) "W itten" ("reduction to tangible form").
Sec. 2-zo3
(2) "Banker's credit" ("Irrevocable credit" etc.); cf. Financing agency, 2-325, 2-104.
"Between merchants," see "Merchants" 2-104(1).
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" (?[?). 2-403.
"Cancellation" (Termination for breach). 2-IO6(4).
"Confirmed credit," 4f. 2-325 comment 3.
"Contract for sale" (contract to sell and sale [passage of title]), 2-1o6.
"Cover" (Mitigate damages). 2-712.
"Installment contract" (contract for both delivery and payment in installments). 2-612.
"Letter of credit" (Irrevocable credit). 2-325.
"Lot" (parcel or single article). 2-105.
"Merchant" (dealer, expert or purported expert). 2-104.
"Overseas" (Air or water shipment etc.); 4. 2-323.
"Person in Position of a Seller"; 4f. 2-707.
"Sale" ("Passing of title" etc.); 4f. Sales Act Sec. i.
"Termination"; c. "Cancellation" 2-io6.
Scc. 3-102
"Banking day" (Day on which every department is open).
"Issue," 4. N. I. L. 191.
"Secondary party," 4f. N. I. L. 192.
"Acceptance" (Must be on the draft).
"Accommodation party" (Surety), see i-2o(39).
"Alteration" (material alteration), quacre if a definition at all.
"Certificates of Deposit" (Negotiable certificates of deposit).
"Definite time" (Definite time subject to contingencies); 4. 3-109.
"Dishonor," 4f. 3-507, 4-404.
"Draft," 4. 3-104, 3 -102(1)(d).
"Holder in due course," 3-302, 1-201(19).
"Instrument" (Negotiable instrument)? probably not a definition.
"Negotiation," 4f. 3-202, 1-2o1(19), circuitous.
"Note" (simple negotiable note), see 3-104(2) & (s)"Notice of Dishonor," see 3-508, Not a definition; but see 1-201(24).
See. 4-ZO4
"Account" (Bank account).
"Customer" (One having bank account etc.).
"Item" (Instrument for payment of money).
'Troperly payable" (?).
"Settle" (to make one of three kinds of payment).
"Collecting bank" (collecting bank not payor).
"Depository bank" (collecting bank).
"Value" (Parting with something) 3-303; 4. N. 1. L. 25, 191.
Sec. 5-1o3
"Customer" (Buyer of credit).
"Draft" (request for payment); c. 3-io2.
"For account of" (receiver of credit or payment).
"Beneficiary" (person entitled to draw).
"Credit" (letter of credit).
"Good faith purchaser" (Holder in due course with knowledge of letter of credit), 4f. 3-302,
1-20(19), 5-105, 7-502(I).
"Issuer" (bank issuing letter of credit).
Sec. 6-o3
"Remittance" ("procurement of payment").
"Cugstomer" (remitter).
"Indirect remittance" (foreign remittance, etc.), 6-io9.
"Local bank," 6-1o9.
"Metropolitan bank" (a bank whose foreign credit facilities are used by another bank which
has none) 6-io9.
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in part, of this eerie unreality of meaning. It should be further noted that these
definitions within themselves involve the use of many terms which have been given
special meaning in other definitions. (The words in italics in the definitions and
sections quoted throughout the rest of the body of this article are such defined terms.)
The result is a compounding of definitions to create a wonderland of exotic words
which may be a delight to the lovers of intricate semantics, but which will rise to
plague any lawyer, businessman, or judge who attempts to apply such a statute to
the regulation of everyday transactions. This extensive use of definitions should
be contrasted with the European codes, both commercial and civil, which are constructed on the current legal language of the time with practically no artificial
definitions, 8 thus assuring continuity of the law in codified form.
B. New Language
There is a further difficulty with the language of the Code. In addition to the
defined words, the draftsmen have seen fit to use a lot of new words to express
old concepts. Where the language is defined there is the mere struggle with definitions, but new phraseology also raises the question of why the new language (not
defined) is used. The Commissioner's notes to the various sections edited in the
Sec. 7-1o2
"Bailee" (Person issuing document of title).
"Consignee" (consignee named in bill).
"Consignor" (consignor named in bill).
"Issuer" (Bailee with variations and additions).
"Value" (consideration).
"Duly negotiated" (negotiation in regular course of business to Holder in Due Course), 7-50.
Sec. 8-zo2
"Issuer" (Includes surety, holding companies or persons controlling principal debtor, trustees,
receivers or like), 8-2oi.
"Restrictive indorsement" (Indorsement to create agency), 8-308(3).
"Subsequent purchaser" (Includes finder, thief, converter, etc.), 8-302.
"Valid" (among others, "does not mean the security is free from forgery"), 8-103.
"Value" (among others "delivery pursuant to a pre-existing contract for sale").
Sec. 9-z05(1)
"Account debtor" (Includes debtor on "chattel paper" or contractsi) but "Account," see 9-io6,
excludes rights "evidenced by" . . . "chattel paper."
"Debtor" ("Person whose property is subject to a security interest," real surety).
'Instrument" (excludes chattel paper).
"Secured lender" (Holder of security interest, loans and otherwise).
Sec. 9-105(2)
"Account" (debt for goods or services evidenced by instrument or chattel paper or judgment).
"Consumers goods" ("Goods used for the debtor's personal family or household purposes").
"Contract right" ("right to payment not yet earned by performance" except wages, salary, judgment or right on instrument).
"Crops" (farm or forest products except lumber or timber).
"Crops," "Equipment," "Farm products," "Inventory," (You look at 9-io9 and then tell me).
"Lien Creditor" (?), 9-303(3) (creditors holding ordinary liens omitted).
"Possession of lender" (Includes possession on behalf of lender except by debtor).
"Proceeds" (Includes "earned" accounts).
21in this respect contrast Louisiana's civil code, Book III, Title VII (Dainow 1947) (taken from French
Civil Code) pp. 448ff. and German Civil Code, Seventh Section (Chang Hai Wang's Trans. (1907)) pp.
95ff., with Article 2 of the proposed Commercial Code; Compare also German Cheque Law, 25 ComEm2CiAL LAws oF -m WoRL, 4 8rff., with Article 3.
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Comments usually cite the familiar provisions of the uniform laws with the explanation "rephrased" or the like. The lawyers and courts are left with the task of
determining to what extent the new language is meant to create new legal relations
not found in the older acts.
One example will suffice to illustrate this ever present difficulty. Section 8-3oi in
defining the rights of a "bona fide purchaser" (holder in due course) of a security
uses the following language:
A bona fide purchaser in addition to acquiring the rights of a purchaser acquires also a
perfect title to the security.

By interpreting the terms in italics which are defined elsewhere2 7 and by consuiting the Comment 8 we reach the conclusion that a "bona fide purchaser" with the
rights of a purchaser,29 takes as an assignee of his transferor; in addition, as a "bona
fide purchaser" by definition 0 probably includes the rights of a "purchaser"'for
value"32 and a "subsequent purchaser"33 for value, he cuts off some of the defenses

of the "issuer"3 4 (corporation) 5 and having perfect title he (with the help of the
Comment) 30 cuts off prior property rights in the paper. In other words he gets
additional rights about the same as a holder in due course. Two questions remain
7 8-302, 8-301(2), 8-io2(b).

"5 Comment to 8-3oz, p. 666.
2' 8-3oi(2) provides: "Upon delivery of a security the purchaser acquires the rights in the security
which his transferor had or had actual authority to convey but a person who himself participated in any
fraud or illegality cannot by later purchase increase his original rights if at the time of such participation
he knew of the fraud or illegality."
"0 8-302(2) provides: "A 'bona fide purchaser' is a purchaser who in good faith, for value and
without notice of any claims of ownership takes delivery of a security in bearer form or of one in
registered form issued to him or indorsed to him or in blank."
31 X-201(32) provides: "'Purchaser' means a person who takes by purchase"; and 1-201(32) "'Purchase' includes taking by sale, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other transaction
creating an interest in property."
S2 8-303 provides: "'Value'
with respect to purchase for value means
(a) any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract including the extension of
immediately available credit whether or not drawn upon and whether or not a charge-back
is provided for in the event of difficulties in collection; or
(b) taking a security as collateral for a pre-existing claim; or
(c) delivery pursuant to a pre-existing contract for sale."
' 8-302(I) provides: "A 'subsequent purchaser' is a person who takes other than by original issue."
8-202(2)(3) and (4) provides: "(a) A security other than one issued by a government or governmental subdivision or agency even though issued with a defect going to its validity or proper form is valid
in the hands of a purchaser for value and without notice of that defect unless the defect involves a violation
of constitutional provisions in which case it is valid only in the hands of a subsequent purchaser for value
and without notice of the defect.
"(b) The rule of subsection (a) applies to an issuer which is a government, governmental subdivision
or agency only if there has been substantial compliance with the legal requirements governing the issue
or if the issuer has received substantial consideration for the issue as a whole or for the particular
security and a stated purpose of the issue is one for which the issuer has power to borrow money.
"(3) Except as otherwise provided in the case of forged or unauthorized signature on issue (Section
8-205), unless otherwise agreed lack of genuineness of a security is a complete defense even against a
purchaser for value and without notice.
"(4) All other defenses of the issuer including nondelivery and conditional delivery of the security
are ineffective against a purchaser for value who has taken without notice of the particular defense."
"5See 8-2o.
="8-301, Comment.
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unanswered. Section 57 of the N. I. L. which the Comment cites defines these
rights as follows:
[He] holds the instrument free from any defect of title of prior parties and free from
defences available to prior parties among themselves, and may enforce payment of the
instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties liable thereon. (Underlining

added.)
Now, first, it becomes immediately evident that both the Code and the Comment
omit reference to defenses of indorsers and transferors.37 Does this mean that these
defenses are not cut off? It might be answered that these rights are included in
"perfect tide" even though title normally refers to property rights rather than to
choses in action, and it is so used in the Commentf8 Perhaps such defenses are
cut off; but regardless of your answer to this there is a second question. "Perfect
title" usually means title against the whole world. Note that N. I. L. Section 57 cuts
off rights of prior parties only. Does this mean that the "bona fide purchaser"
under the Code, if he be a trustee, agent, factor, receiver, or other fiduciary, has
perfect tide against his beneficiary? This is a startling result but clearly within
the wording and the legislative history, else why use the new terminology? If it be
answered that the "bona fide purchase" requires him to take "without notice of any
claims of ownership" 9 including those of his own beneficiaries, then you get th"e
equally startling result that no fiduciary and the like can have the rights of a "bona
fide purchaser" (holder in due course). Either result is made possible and probable
under this use of new words. It might be answered, "Anybody knows that is not
the law." To resort to that kind of interpretation, it must be assumed that there
is a complete and available "common" law in all jurisdictions outside of the Code.
Unfortunately no such uniform common law (outside of the statutes to be replaced)
exists. Only if it did could draftsmanship of this kind be justified, and if that were
the state of the law, there would be little need for the Code.
This is not an unusual case to be found only after long research. The identical
error of using "perfect title" or its equivalent to change the present clearer phraseology of uniform laws, is repeated three times4" in other parts of the Code. New
language appearing throughout the entire draft4 will necessarily be subjected to some
sort of historical interpretation. In fact how else do you explain its use?
This novel wording so popular with the draftsmen causes new problems to grow
where none existed before, which, for their solution, require a naive postulation of an
omnipotent "common" law such as only broods over law schools.
" But they have liabilities, see 8-306, and therefore probably have defenses.
'8

8-3oI, Comment i.

8-302(2) supra, note 30.
0o7-502(0)(a) and (b), and cf. 3-305(), "free from (i)all claims on the part of any person."
"1The expressions "rephrased," "completely rephrased," and the like in reference to present Uniform
Laws appear fifty-four times in Comments to Article 2, Sales, alone.
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II
UNITY OF TIM CODE

A. The Same Word With Multiple Meanings or Definitions
Not only are words and definitions throughout the Code used in unnatural or
new meanings, but also it is quite common to find the same word given different
connotations in various parts of the Code.
Some of the most glaring of these shifts of meaning are:
Value. Although the present uniform laws drafted at different times by various
people get along with almost identical definitions of value, this Code contains
four substantially different definitions of the term. Articles 3 and 4 use a concept
of performed contracts, with a slight variation in Article 443 Article 7 adopts contracts, checking credit, and security for pre-existing claims; 4 Article 8, consideration,
any extension of credit, security for pre-existing claims, and delivery of goods
pursuant to contracts; 45 Article 9, satisfaction or security for pre-existing claims or
consideration; 46 and, in addition, it creates another concept, "new value,"4 7 apparently
borrowed with alterations from the Uniform Trust Receipts Act 48

- -The

following sections of Uniform Laws are on value: Conditional Sales Act 76(1), Bills of Lading
Act 53, Stock Transfer Act 22, Warehouse Receipts Act 58; and cf. Negotiable Instruments Law 25, 27,
and 191.

433-303 provides: "A holder takes for value:
"(a) to the extent that the agreed consideration has been performed or that he acquires a security
interest in or a lien on the instrument otherwise than by legal process; or
"(b) when he takes the instrument in payment of or as security for an antecedent claim against
any person whether or not the claim is due; or
"(c) when he gives a negotiable instrument for it or makes an irrevocable commitment to a third
person."

Cf. 4-1o4(3)(m): "'Value.'

Section 3-303."

But c. 4-212:

"When Bank IsHolder in Due Course.
For purposes of determining its status as a holder in due course, the bank has given value to the
extent that it has a security interest in an item and a bank which takes a negotiable instrument before
maturity for deposit in a checking account in good faith and without notice of any claim or defense is a
holder in due course to the extent that credit given for the instrument is withdrawn or applied, whether
before or after maturity, before the bank has had a reasonable opportunity, after having received notice
of a claim or defense, to charge back the amount of the interest purchased or credit given."
As 7-102(l)(g) provides: "'Value' with respect to purchase for value means
(i) any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract; or
(ii) the extension of immediately available checking credit whether or not drawn upon and
whether or not a charge-back is provided for in the event of difficulties in collection; or
(iii) taking goods or documents of title in satisfaction of or as security for a preexisting claim."
8-303 provides: "'Value' with respect to purchase for value means
(a) any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract including the extension of immediately
available credit whether or not drawn upon and whether or not a charge-back is provided
for in the event of difficulties in collection; or
(b) taking a security as collateral for a preexisting claim; or
(c) delivery pursuant to a pre-existing contract for sale."
'n 9-io8(i) provides: "A person gives 'value' for rights in property if he takes his rights
(a) in satisfaction of or as security for a preexisting claim; or
(b) in return for any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract."
479-o8(2) provides: "Where a secured lender makes an advance, incurs an obligation or otherwise
gives new value which is to be secured by after-acquired property his security interest in the after-acquired
collateral is not security for a pre-existing debt or claim if the debtor acquires his rights in such collateral
either in the ordinary course of his business or under contract of purchase made within a reasonable
time after the making of the security agreement and pursuant thereto."
'8 P. 728, Comment 2.
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Among other things this gets the fantastic result that a bank taking, for credit to
a depositor's account, a draft with a negotiable document attached can, in this
ordinary commercial situation, be a holder for value of the document but not of the
draft 9
Customer has at least four different meanings. In Articles 3 and 4 it is a person
having a bank account;"0 in Article 5 a buyer of a credit;r1 in Article 6 a remitter
and a "local bank."
In none of these articles is the term used in its most common
commercial meaning.
Letter of Credit. Although Article 5 is devoted to letters of credit and defines and
explains them at some length, which meaning is adopted in Article 3,P3 in Article 2
the term means "irrevocable credit" etc.54
Account has at leastO5 three defined meanings. In Articles 3,4, and 6 it means
bank account;55 in Article 9 it has contradictory definitions. In 9-105(a),
"Account Debtor" means the person who is indebted on account, chattel paper, or
contract right,

while in 9-TO6 it means
a right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered which is not
evidenced by chattel paper.F

Even casual readings of the Code will disclose many more cases where words
are used in multiple meanings. 58
B. Same Concept With Different Words
Another example of lack of coherence is the fact that the same or similar concepts are expressed in entirely different language in various articles of the Code.
Two glaring instances of this annoying style will suffice.
The good faith purchaser for value of negotiable paper who cuts off defenses
and gets better title than his vendor, appears in all sorts of guises. Although there
"'Cf-3-303, 7-102(I)(g). Cf. 4-211, 4-212, 4-104(I)(e): "'Item' means any instrument for the
payment of money .....
6°3-102(3), 4 -io4(i)(d): "'Customer' means any person having an account with a bank or for
whom a bank has agreed to collect items and includes a bank carrying an account with another bank."
5"5-I03(I)(a): "A 'customer' is a buyer or other person who causes a bank to issue a credit."
' 6-xo3 (I)(b): "A 'customer' is the person who initiates the remittance and includes a purchaser of a
bank's draft drawn to order of the remittee." Cf. 6-iog(i): "Unless otherwise agreed, a local bank is
a customer of a metropolitan bank."
533-102(3)" See definition of credit, 5-104, too long to repeat here.
5&2-103(2), 2-325(3): "Unless otherwise agreed the term 'letter of credit' or 'banker's credit' in a
contract for sale means an irrevocable credit available by its terms not only to the seller but also to a
good faith purchaser of drafts drawn under it which is issued by a financing agency of good repute and,
where the shipment is overseas, of good international repute.
"For use in another sense, see 3-206 and 6-112.
563-102(3), 6-103(3), 4-I04()(a): "'Account' means any account with a bank and includes a
checking, time, interest or savings account."
"'Of course it is intellectually possible to distinguish between account as used in "Account Debtor"
and in "Account"; but what is the practical value of this type of intellectual gymnastics when there are
plenty of other words available to express the ideas?
"aA few of these are: "Money" 1-201(23), 3-107; "Issuer" 3-102(I)(c), 5-104, 7-102(s)(f), 8-201;
"Draft" 3-102(i)(d), 3-104, 5-103; "Goods" 2-105, 2-107, 9-1o, 9-109; "Buyer in ordinary course of
business" 2-403, 3-302 (see Comment 3), 9-307, cf. 7-501(4).
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has been some effort to unify the concept in the definition of "holder,"5 it ends
there. In Articles 3 and 4 he is a "holder in due course"; 61 inArticle 5 he is a "good
faith purchaser";1 in Article 7, "a holder to whom negotiable document of title has
been duly negotiated."6 2 Article 8 calls him a "bona fide purchaser"; 3 and in
Article 9 he has all three of the above meanings 4 plus the designation "assignee who
takes his assignment for value, in good faith and without notice of a claim or a
defense except as to defenses of the type which may be asserted against a holder in
due course of a negotiabe instrument under the article on Commercial Paper,"6'5
and he also has a near kin, "Purchaserfor value of chattel paper."66
Now it may be that these terms are intended to signify technical differences in
substantive rights available to the parties designated; but, if they do, such differences
are not clearly set out. As a matter of fact these concepts are so much alike that all
but the last could be codified under the term "holder in due course."
A second example of a failure to use general terminology is found in the manner
in which the Code deals with the concept of warranty. Although this subject is
currently covered by at least five uniform laws6 7 and the Contracts Restatement,"
all agree that a transferor of commercial paper whether negotiable or not is subject
to at least four basic warranties: (i)the paper is genuine; (2) the transferor has
tide or right to transfer; (3)he has no knowledge of disabling facts; and (4)the
obligation is valid6 As is to be expected there is a variation of wording in the
statutes but in many the terminology is almost identical. Unity here would therefore
seem to be indicated, and appears to be possible to accomplish, with variations
necessary only to cover special instances. But what has the Code done? Articles 3
and 4 though couched in almost identical language set out seven warranties;10
Article 7 covers three,71 and Article 8 the same three but in quite different verbiage72
and with some additions as to broker's warranties.73 Now due to different verbiage,
it is doubtful if the warranties set out are coexistent even when the different types
of paper appear in the same transaction; but what is worse, the remaining six
articles (except Sales, Article 2) though they all cover situations where transfers
of commercial paper and contracts are involved, seem to be silent on this basic
subject. The Sales Article sections on warranties74 are couched in language which
seems to have no relation to the subject elsewhere in the Code.

ISO0-ox(z9): "'Holder' means a person who is in possession of a negotiable document of title or
negotiable instrument or investment security so issued or indorsed that he can negotiate it"
do3-302, 4-Xo4(3)(g), 4-212.
625-105.
" 8-302; cf. 8-301(3).
G 9-2o8(2).

627-502.
64 9-309.
as 9-308(5).

"'N.
I. L. 65, 66; S. A. 13-16, 35, 36; B. L. A. 35, 36; W. R. A. 44, 45; S. T. A. ii.
"Section 175.
'OSee FstanasucK K. BEUTEL, MATE.RIALS AND CASES ON UNIFORM COMnERciAL LAWS 410 (1950).
70 3-47, 4-210, 4-306.

1 8-3o6.
7&2-312 to 2-318.

1 7-507.

3 8-314.
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The Code then is less unified on this basic subject than are the current uniform
laws and the Contracts Restatement, and covers much less of the subject matter than
the current statutes and Restatement.
Similar absences of unity in basic concepts of commercial law are evident throughout various articles of the Code.
III
A

SAMPLE PROBLEM

What has been said so far is mostly theory; and, perhaps, can be answered
simply by the proposition that if the Code offers workable regulation of ordinary
business transactions, difficulties of language are incidental and will be overcome
as the profession becomes used to the new expressions. It would be wise, therefore,
to pause long enough to apply the Code to a sample commercial case as a test of its
usefulness. Such a problem, which arises every day, might be the following. A
local dealer buys from a farmer a heavy wagon and two fine draft horses for which
he gives him a note, otherwise negotiable in form, for $300.00 with a clause, "This
note is given for a team of horses and a wagon, title remaining in the seller until
paid."7'5 The farmer discounts the note for credit to his account with his local
banker. The dealer then sells the horses and wagon to a second farmer who borrows the money on a chattel mortgage from bank number two. At maturity the
dealer defaults, claiming fraud. The discounting banker asks for his rights under
the Uniform Commercial Code. The Code purports to codify the law both as to
notes and security.
(i) As to the note:
The note is not a "note" within the meaning of Section 3-104(3) because it "purports to create or reserve security" so we turn to the Security Article, 9. It provides70
"nothing in this article limits the rights of a holder in due course of a negotiable
instrument"; but this is not a "negotiable instrument:' It is chattel paper within
the definition of Section 9-io5(i) (b)."
Section 9-308 provides, "a purchaser for value of chattel paper who obtains
delivery thereof has a right to such paper and its proceeds in priority to the rights
of an earlier secured lender," etc. Of course there is no "earlier secured lender" but
this appears to be the closest section. So the bank has some right in "proceeds" but
nothing is said about the rights on the note against the maker or indorser. The
N. I. L. covers this but the N. I. L. would be repealed by the Commercial Code.1 8
" If the reader desires he can add a chattel mortgage, conditional sale, or other evidence of title
retention without further complicating the problem. 9-io5(i)(b), infra note 77.
789-309.
7 9-105(x)(b): "'Chattel paper' means a writing of a type whose transfer in ordinary course of

business requires delivery and which evidences a security interest in or lease of goods. If the writing
is of a type whose transfer in ordinary course of business does not customarily require delivery, the
right is an account or contract right. Where an instrument is secured by chattel paper both writings together constitute the chattel paper relating to the transaction .
78 I-i02o.

Tim

PROPOSED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

So the attorney is remitted to the decisions. The recent decisions are not helpful
because for twenty-five to fifty years the subject has been controlled by the N. I. L.,
and, before that time, the law was in complete confusion on such matters as negotiability and liability of indorsers of chattel paper. This omission is the more surprising because chattel notes have been a cause celebre ever since the N. I. L. was
first drafted.79
If by any chance this analysis is wrong and the note is, or could be made, negotiable within Article 3, then the bank, having given credit, is not a holder for value,
and therefore not a holder in due course, under the provisions of Section 3-303,
which throws us back on the old common law first-in-first-out doctrine, with its
maze of nonsensically impractical bookkeeping problems. But due to the fact that
value in Article 9, Section 9-io8, is "Any consideration sufficient to support a simple
contract" the discounting bank although not a holder for value of the note, by the
same operation is a "purchaser for value" of the "chattel paper"; so it may be that
the bank has some "rights" in the horses and wagon under the Commercial Code.
(2) As to the security:

The horses and wagon are dearly "collateral" under the definition of Section
9-1o5 s° and the discounting bank may have a "purchase money security interest";"1
but if it does it is as transferee of the farmer-vendor. What then were the farmervendor's rights? Section 9-oi provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law a security agreement is effective according to its terms
between the parties and against any purchaser from or creditor of the debtor.

So, unless the law provides otherwise, the security agreement is good against the
purchasing farmer in the hands of the farmer-vendor.
The Code provides, Section 9-3io, that the purchaser of collateral takes subject
to perfected security interests, and Section 9-302 provides what interests must be
protected by filing a financing statement (which apparently did not occur here).
A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests except the following: . . . (c) a purchase money security interest in farm equipment having a purchase
price not in excess of $2,500....
But Section 9-307 provides:
In the case of inventory, a buyer in ordinary course of business takes free of a security
interest even though perfected....
' See BRAwqAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw 421, 437, 476 (3d ed. I919), reproducing the AmesBrewster controversy on this point.
So9-I5(I) (c): " 'Collateral' means the property subject to a security interest . .
81 9-107: "A security interest is a 'purchase money security interest' to the extent that it is

(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value to enable
the debtor to acquire rights in collateral if such value is in fact so used; or
(c) taken by a person who for the purpose of enabling the debtor to pay for or acquire rights in
collateral makes advances or incurs an obligation not more than ten days before or after
the debtor receives the collateral even though the value given is not in fact used to pay the
price."
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It appears then that if the horses and wagon are "farm products" the financing
agreement must be registered to perfect the security interest. If they are "equipment" such registration is not necessary and if they are "inventory" the security is
cut off regardless of registration, by a "buyer in ordinary course of business."
Section 9-109(5) provides "inventory does not include farm products or equipment!" This phrase makes the terms mutually exclusive but creates a dangling disjunctive (characteristic of much of the draftsmanship of this Code) which would
seem to leave the term "equipment" subject to about five meanings; s2 but fortunately
all of these terms are defined in Section 9-1o9 as follows:
Goods are ...(3)"equipment" if they are used primarily in business (including farming
or a profession) or by a debtor who is a non-profit organization or a governmental subdivision or agency or if the goods are not included in the definitions of inventory, farm
products or consumer goods. Equipment does not include goods which at the time a
security interest attaches are being held or prepared for sale or to be furnished under a
contract of service;
(4)"farm products" if they are crops, livestock and products of crops or livestock in their
unmanufactured state, such as ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup, milk and eggs and
if they remain in the possession of a debtor from whose raising, fattening, grazing or other
farming operations they derive;
(5)"inventory" if they are held or are being prepared for sale or to be furnished under a
contract of service or if they are raw materials, work in process or materials used or
consumed in a business. Inventory does not include farm products or equipment....
After a careful and prayerful examination of these definitions one might venture
the opinion that the wagon at the time of the first sale was "equipment." The
horses at this time would be "farm products" except for the fact that they do not
"remain in the possession of a debtor from whose .. . farming operations they
derive." At that time they were not "inventory" because they were not "being held
or.prepared for sale" so they must have been "livestock."
Just what is the significance of this designation is not apparent but it seems that
so far as the wagon is concerned, being equipment and by value under $2,500.0o ,
filing is not necessary to perfect the security interest; but "livestock" is not included
in the exception to the requirements of filing 3 in Section 9-302 so the vendor-farmer
"5(i)Farm products or farm equipment, (2) or any kind of equipment (3) or farm cqiupmcnt if
found on farms (4) or farm equipment whether on farms or not, or (5)any kind of equipment found
on farms.
83It is not apparent just where one would file to protect "livestock"

defined in 9-xog(6), under

Section 9-4o(i) which reads as follows:

"(i) If filing is required by this Article (Section 9-302) in order to perfect a security interest, a
financing statement must be filed
(a) when the collateral is accounts, chattel paper, contract rights, inventory or equipment other
than equipment used in farming operations, then in the office of the Secretary of State [and
in addition if all of the debtor's places of business are in a single county, in the office of the
. . . in that county]; and
(b) when the collateral is consumer goods, equipment used in farming operations or farm
products, then in the office of the . . . in the county of the debtor's residence but if the
debtor is not a resident of this state then in the office of the . . .in the county where the
goods are located after the security interest has attached, and in addition when the collateral
is growing crops in the office of the . .. in the county where the land on which the crops
are growing is located."
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has not perfected his security interest in the horses. Since the security interest, not
perfected, is cut off by subsequent purchasers without knowledge, s4 if the purchasing
farmer had no knowledge of the security interest in the horses, it is gone. However
this is not the end; when tie horses and wagon came into the hands of the dealer
they were clearly "inventory" within the definition of Section 9 -io9 (d) above. Now
Section 9-307(1) provides:

In the case of inventory, a buyer in ordinary course of business takes free of a security
interest even though perfected and even though the buyer knows of the terms of the
security agreement.
A "buyer in ordinary course of business" is not defined in the current draft of
Article 9 nor listed with the approved definitions but the farmer-purchaser seems
to be such a buyer.s5 So the farmer-purchaser cuts off all the rights of the farmervendor in the "collateral," "equipment," "livestock," and "inventory," ie., the horses
and wagon.
Now, does the discounting bank get any greater rights in the "collateral" than
the farmer-vendor? Sections 9-308 and 9-2o8, the only ones on the subject, say
nothing about the point so the bank, under Section 9-319 is probably only a common
law assignee of non-negotiable paper with rights no greater than its assignor. But
if the counsel can prove that at "law merchant" in the state involved the note was
"negotiable," then perhaps Section 9-309 ("Nothing in this Article limits the rights
of a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument (Section 3-302) .. .") may be
used by analogy, as provided in Section 1-102(1) and (). s

Now if you still follow me (I am not sure I do) the discounting bank by law
merchant may be a holder in due course of the.note; and as such, by ancient common law, is a holder in due course of the perfected security, s7 ie., the wagon, and
may take it or the "proceeds" if the rights of the farmer-purchaser or the second
financing bank have not intervened. (You may try your hand at working out the
"proceeds" and the rights of the second bank. I am exhausted.)
After intricate study it appears that the discounting bank has no rights directly
given by the Code against (i) the farmer-vendor; (2) the debtor (except for "proceeds"); (3) the horses or wagon; (4) the farmer-purchaser; or (5) the financing
bank.
"' 9-3o(1)(d): "An unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights . . . of a buyer even

though not a buyer in ordinary course of business to the extent that he receives delivery of the collateral
before he receives knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected."
"The Sales Article, 2-403(4), partially defines him as follows:
"'Buyer in ordinary course of business' includes a person to whom goods are shipped pursuant to a
pre-existing contract or one to whom they are delivered on credit, but does not include a pawnbroker
or a person takinh from one not dealing in goods of that kind or a person taking an interest in inventory
in bulk or as security or a person taking at an hour or under other circumstances which negate good
faith or a person purchasing from a farmer."
" 1-02() & (3): "(1) This Act is remedial and shall be liberally construed and applied to promote

its underlying reasons, purposes and policies.... " "(3) A provision of this Act which is stated to be
applicable 'between merchants' or otherwise to be of limited application need not be so limited when the
circumstances and underlying reasons justify extending its application."
" Demainbray v. Metcalfe, 2 Vern.

6

98, 23 Eng. Rep. io52 (Ch. 1715).
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All else must be determined by the "law merchant" or "common law" which
has been more or less confused or dormant for the last fifty years.
A "Code" that so ingeniously sidesteps simple problems of law which it should
solve can only be a bonanza to an already overworked legal profession and a burden
on commerce.
IV
SCOPE AND COVERAGE

As the readers will begin to suspect from the foregoing, the Commercial Code
is not a code at all in the sense in which the term is commonly used to indicate the
reductions of general concepts of law to written statutes. The style of the various
sections is more like the Restatement which was designed as a detailed statement of
holdings of cases rather than a scientific exposition of legal principles. The sections
are often limited to narrow statements of facts in a style using long and complicated sentences full of exceptions within exceptions and conditions upon conditions.88
Such particular statements, as indicated by the problem above, leave vast areas of
the law uncovered; and reduce the "Code" to a mere collection of statutes. The
scope of these individual statutes may be roughly classified as follows.
Article 2, Sales, according to the Comment, is a revision of the Uniform Sales
Act in different language, and with some additions. Sixty per cent of the sections
in this article seem to contain much the same legal concepts as, but a rewording of,
the original Sales Act, with no important substantive changes except that the sales
provisions on documents of title are moved to Article 7. The new sections are
largely devoted to details of court procedure, definitions, and narrow rules covering
specific situations. Whether this is a better or worse codification than the Sales
Act would require a detailed examination far beyond the scope of this article. Such
studies as have been made do not seem to be complimentary.'
Article 3, which replaces the N. I. L., a general statute covering all negotiable
instruments payable in money and the rights and duties of the parties thereto, is a
narrow statute involving only checks, drafts, some promissory notes, and certificates
of depositY0 In no place in the "Code" are there to be found any general sections
on various types of negotiable paper, all of which are treated pretty much alike
in current business practice. For the negotiability of bonds, chattel paper, investment
trust certificates, and all other types of commercial paper, and the rights of parties
thereto, one must look elsewhere. Some of this is picked up in other articles but
much is left dangling in a fashion which is certain to be a source of confusion
" For example see 1-105, 2-201, 2-401, 2-503, 2-7o6, 3-304, 3-307, 4-2o8, 4-301, 4-3I!, 5-118, 5-125,
7-403, 7-409, 8-402, and almost any section in Artide 9.
"See

Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REv.

561 (1950); Rabel, Sales in the Proposed Commercial Code, 17 U. OF Cm. L. Rrev. 427 (1950).
go 3-104.
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and a drawback to the enactment of the "Code." A detailed study will show that
Article 3, even as reduced, is technically inferior to the N. I. LY
Article 4, Bank Deposits and Collection, is a misnomer. It is really a Bank
Collection statute. The sections on the rights of customers and depository banks are
only eight in number and consist largely of detailed rules governing the rights of
the banks in collection transactions. The general relations of banks and customers
are almost entirely omitted as they might properly be because they seldom involve
interstate transactions. But even as a bank collection act only, it is a much needed
statute and a vast improvement upon the bankers association "Bank Collection
Code" now enacted in about twenty states. It might be well to disconnect this
article and adopt it as a uniform law.even if the "Code" were not finally recommended.
Article 5 covers twenty-six sections codifying letters of credit and seems pretty
well to cover the subject.
Article 6, Miscellaneous Banking Transactions, covers only thirteen sections and
is just what it says-"Miscellaneous."
Article 7, forty-four sections, is a consolidation of the Bills of Lading and Warehouse Receipts Acts and provisions of the Sales Act, which was easy to do because
all three of the statutes were practically identical, but because of wholesale changes
in language it is doubtful whether it is as good as the original three acts.
Article 8, Investment Securities, in thirty-seven sections, covers much of the
material now in the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, and applies the same principles
to stocks and bonds whether registered or not. It is a worth-while attempt at
codification in this important field but as indicated by some of the examples above
it is far from perfection. It has probably oversimplified too many complicated commercial institutions; and in connection with Section 1-1o7, as indicated below, puts
an intolerable straitjacket on finance transactions.
Article 9, Secured Transactions, is the gem of a great idea already pretty well
covered by the not very widely adopted Uniform Conditional Sales Act. It is an
attempt to gather under one heading all types of security transactions but it is still
too fragmentary and detailed to be offered as a code. There are also grave doubts
whether the devices offered for secured transactions are sufficiently various to meet
the requirements of the business world. Much more research along these lines is
indicated. Here again Section i-io7, as indicated below, taken in conjunction with
an inadequately codified law, would play havoc in the business world.
Article io is just another Bulk Transfer Act of which there are many now on the
books. It is not important as a uniform law because there is little interstate business
involved in this type of transaction.
Taken as a whole this "Code" is a collection of nine statutes, three of which- '
Sales, Negotiable Paper, Documents of Tide-covering 6o per cent of its pages are
91Some studies leading to this conclusion have already been published: Palmer, Negotiable Instruments
under the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 MicH. L. REV. 225, 310 (195o).
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now uniformly adopted in as good or better form and in much more usable language than the present draft. Of the remaining six statutes, two, Miscellaneous
Banking Transactions and Bulk Sales, are of no partciular significance. The other
four, constituting 35 per cent of the "Code" by volume-Letters of Credit, Bank
Collections, Investment Securities, and Secured Transactions-are a real and needed
addition to uniform laws. In the proper form they would constitute the most
valuable contribution of the "Code" to current law.
V
AUTHORITATIVE PROVISIONS FOR INTERPRETATION

Article i of the "Code," General Provisions, in addition to definitions already
discussed, contains a number of sections of general applicability usually found in
uniform statutes; but in addition it embodies, in Part I,a number of provisions
dealing with statutory construction which are unique in the history of codification
in that they attempt to set up a fragmentary technique of interpretation. While
many cases in the practice of interpreting uniform laws have appeared, and some
generalizations along this line can be made,9" it is doubtful if the subject is ready
for codification, at least on the broad and dogmatic scale attempted in some of these
sections. This effort to straitjacket the courts in application of the statute has
already been harshly criticized by a renowned expert on codification. 8 Little
need be added here except to point out the practical results of some of these
provisions.
Section -=2 for example provides: "A provision of this Act which is stated to
be applicable between 'merchants' or otherwise to be of limited application need not
be so limited when the circumstances and underlying reasons justify extending its
application." This section is much broader than the usual analogical interpretation
applied properly to codes in that it attempts to empower the courts to extend or repeal sections of this statute when the judges feel justified in doing so. It is clearly
unconstitutional in all jurisdictions of the continental United States which have
sharp separation of powers,94 in that it is a direct delegation of legislative powers
to the judiciary. It might also fail as such a delegation simply from vagueness.
Even if by some chance the section were to be held constitutional it is doubtful
whether the courts would accept the power, and if they would it would be fatal to
uniformity because it gives the court power to change statutory rules of law "when
the circumstances and underlying reasons justify" it.
Section i-io5, with its alternate state and federal versions, which is far too long
and complicated to reproduce here in detail, is a fantastic attempt in one section
to repeal the conflict of laws as it applies to this subject. Roughly it provides that
whenever a transaction whose subject matter is covered by this "Code" in any way
"5 See BEU i's BRANNON NEGOTIABLE
9 Rabel, supra note 89, at 4 28ff.
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touches the forum, this "Code" shall apply. Not only is it in "disregard of every
known system of conflict of laws"9 5 but if ever enacted it would be the destruction

of uniformity; and would continually raise the spectre of choice of forum which is
the bane of the existence of practicing lawyers and businesssmen alike. The draftsmen glibly justify this exception by a naive argument about as follows: "It is a good
code so let's apply it in all possible cases." Although one might doubt the major
premise, the practical results of adopting such an argument would be disastrous.
Take for example a hypothetical case. A merchant in New York buys goods in
San Francisco giving a negotiable note payable in thirty days. The San Francisco
vendor discounts the note at his bank. The maturity date passes and nothing
happens. The "Code" is not in effect in either state; but, in the process of collection,
the note is indorsed in Chicago where the "Code" has been enacted. If the note
was in fact dishonored, the merchant, in San Francisco, discharged from his liability
as indorser by lack of notice under the N. I. L. both by the law of New York and of
California, may find himself held in a suit in Chicago at any time within the statute
of limitations under the provisions of Section 1-105(3)6 because absence of notice

is not a defense under the "Code. ' ' "T Such a result is probably unconstitutional because it is contrary to the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution.
The whole of Section 1-105 is obviously a club to force adoption of the "Code" in
all states, but if the "Code" were so adopted that would not end the difficulty. The
history of well-drafted uniform laws such as the Sales Act and Negotiable Instruments Law has shown that interpretation of the best language (to say nothing of
the extra difficulties made certain by the exotic phraseology in this "Code") is bound
to reach conflicting results in various states. With a provision such as Section i-1o5,
then legal advice will be impossible because it will have to take into consideration
court decisions interpreting the "Code" where it could not even have been foreseen
that the law would apply, simply because of a fortuitous routing of shipment, collection, and like transactions beyond the control of the principal parties to the original
contract. When it is understood that practically all of the transactions which this
"Code" will cover involve interstate commerce, and that it may never be uniformly
adopted in all states, the potentialities of mischief for this section are legion. The
practical effect would be that each statutory or judicial departure from the uniform
rule in any state would be potentially multiplied by the number of other states
touching its transactions. This would be the death of uniformity.
But for sheer presumptuousness and impossibility of administration Section 1-107
takes all of the prizes.0 8 It provides:
" Rabel, supra note 89, at 428.
Go -XO5(3): "The Articles on Commercial Paper (Article 3) and Bank Deposits and Collections
(Article 4) apply whenever any contract or transaction within the terms of any one of the Articles is
made or occurs after the effective date of this Act and the contract
(a) is made, offered or accepted or the transaction occurs within this state; or
(b) is to be performed or completed wholly or in part within this state; or
(c) involves commercial paper which is made, drawn or transferred within this state."
:7 3.50x.

o' See also Rabel, supra note 89, at

4 28ff.
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The rules enunciated in this Act which are not qualified by the words "unless otherwise
agreed" or similar language are mandatory and may not be waived or modified by
agreement.
So far as the writer knows this has no counterpart in modern legislation. It has
always been the most effective argument against codification that it created inflexible
rules of law, and this in spite of the fact that statutes in all free countries, except
where particular sections of the enactments themselves provide that they are mandatory, are construed to mean that codified rules of law can be varied or waived by
written agreement of the parties. This "Code" under Section 1-1o 7 makes variations by agreement an exception to the general rule. Surely the draftsmen are not
so omnipotent that they can set up a pattern of law governing our complicated
commercial world which can be mandatory for the parties in all cases except those
which the draftsmen have considered for exclusion. A single example will show the
rigidity of this provision. With minor exceptions" it seems impossible as the "Code"
now stands for a businessman to issue a "security"'" and make it non-negotiable" 1
even if it so provides on the face of the contract.10 2 Such arrangements put an intolerable straitjacket on the business world.
There is however an even further difficulty with this section which lies in the
ambiguity of the term "mandatory" itself. Good statutes cannot be drafted in terms
of mandatory and nonmandatory. There are at least fourteen degrees of compulsion
that may be found in statutes and almost all of them are exemplified by provisions
of this "Code" or other uniform statutes. Roughly they are as follows: (i) Mandatory, act must be done with criminal penalty for refusal 03 (2) Mandatory, act
must be done, no criminal liability but civil liability1 0 4 (3) The act prohibited
on criminal penalty' 0 3 (4) Act prohibited on civil penalty. 0 6 (5) Form required
if you want certain results under provision of law.' 07 (6) Mandatory, but a choice
between means used for getting results' 0 8 (7) Form necessary for the results
desired but can be changed by the parties.0 9 (8) Results follow in absence of
agreement." 0 (9) No results without agreement to the contrary, but can be changed
by the parties."' In addition to prohibited acts such as (3) and (4) above, (Io) the
act may not be prohibited but civil penalties follow. 12 (ii) The act may not be
prohibited but results in civil penalties which can be changed by contract 1 (12)
9

For example 8-202(5).
8-102(l).
101 8"3ox(3) and note.
.0.8-202(4) provides: "All other defenses of the issuer including nondelivery and conditional
delivery of the security are ineffective against a purchaser for value who has taken without notice of the
particular defense." But cf. 8-204: "A restriction on transfer imposed by the issuer even though otherwise
lawful is ineffective unless noted on the security." And note that the sections above cited do not contain
100

the exceptions required by 1-107.

...Requirements for registration in Army draft; none in Commercial Code.
04
'
1

B. L. A. 1i, 14; 7-403() and (3), 7-405().
.. B. L. A. 44-50; W. R. A. 50-55.
10.07-304() and (4), 4-103(l).
208 3_110, 3-111.
210 2-325(3), 1-105, 2-714, 2-715-.
212 7-402.

207 3-104, 9-302, 9-401.
109 3-120.
11 8-204, 8-208.
1..8-208, 3-407(2) (a).
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The act is not prohibited but void as to one party." 4 (13) Liability follows the act
only when connected with express intent." 5 (14) Liability for the act regardless of
intent but can be waived if intent to do so is expressed." 6 The reader can without
difficulty add more variations. In the ordinary enforcement of law only the first four
listed above are usually spoken of as mandatory and cannot be changed by contract.
Now when it comes to applying the provisions of Section 1-107 which of the other
ten are excepted?
It seems clear that the "Code" would be better off if Sections 1-102, 1-105, and
1-107 were omitted entirely, leaving the courts to use their own judgment in establishing postulates of interpretation for the statute.
The "Code" itself already rejects the rules of Sections i-1o5 and i-io7 in whole
or in part in Articles 4"17 and 9118 and in fragmentary places elsewhere."'. In
addition Articles 1-io8 and 1-207 provide for partial waiver of Section 1-107.
Section 1-105 in both versions also stipulates that the parties themselves
may agree on the law which applies. These sections allowing waivers of otherwise
burdensome provisions put a great premium on sophistication, and provide a means
of entrapment for innocent parties. They will also lead to all kinds of errors in
interpretation. For example anybody reading Sections 1-107 and 2-714 and 2-715
together would conclude that no liquidated damages were available, but on discovery of 2-720 and 2-721 it appears that they are. The N. I. L. has been roundly
criticized because conflicting cases arose through the courts failing to read all of its
sections together;' 20 but in no place in the N. I. L. are there traps within traps to
equal this one, or others that will develop through having parts of the code "mandatory" and parts not, depending upon sections scattered throughout eight hundred
pages of printed "Code" and Comment.
Just what is the effect of Section 1-102 described above, giving the courts wide
latitude in applying the "Code," upon the mandatory provisions of Section I-1o7?
Merely deleting these obnoxious sections from the "Code" would not be enough.
This is especially true in the case of 1-107. Throughout the "Code" there has been
an attempt, not fully realized, to state the rules in the light of Section 1-107. Were
it deleted, as it must be if freedom of contract in business is to continue, every
section of the "Code" will have to be re-examined with a view to returning it to the
ordinary usage of statutory draftsmanship. (A large but not impossible task in
itself.)
214 3.4o4(z)"
11t 3-404(2).
1" 8.204, 4-301 (2), 2-312, 4-313.
117 4.102(2), 4-103.
1289-103.
119 For example what is the effect of 8-204, supra, note 102.

Note also 2-720, 2-721, 9-3x7, and

9-319.
...See BEuTEL'S BRANNAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 88ff. (948).
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V
CONCLUSIONS
The "Code" in its present outline is a worth-while and necessary effort but it is

not yet ready for enactment. Unless the present style and draftsmanship are
changed it would be much better to print the current uniform laws in a pamphlet
and add Articles 4, 5, and 9, revised and enlarged, calling the collection a Commercial Code.
It is possible that the specific defects indicated above could be corrected; and for
aught the writer knows, they already may have been eliminated; but these are
only samples chosen at random of the results that flow from this kind of codification. The "Code"' as a whole must be completely restudied as to language, unity,
and style by a committee of top legal experts in the subjects codified, aided y a
similar group of commercial experts directing research into the business practices
which would be governed and created. Such a revision should be planned to
reduce to a minimum the dislocation of law and good business practices by building
upon the language and rules of present uniform laws. There should be added to
the revised current uniform laws provisions covering the subject matter of Articles
4, 5, and 9 of the current "Code" making such changes and adding such devices as
would be proved necessary by careful research into the operation of the law and
the needs of business. If this were done there would be built upon the foundations

of the current effort a commercial code which would serve the interests of legitimate
business throughout the country. To recommend the act in its present form would
be to invite chaos and risk possible loss of years of fruitful labor on the present
uniform commercial laws.

